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Large shipyards for gigantic cruise ships require a spe-
cial attention to safety due to the huge number of workers
involved and to the complex structure of spaces. A criti-
cal issue of such environments is to keep the environment
under control to avoid a disordered evacuation in case of
an emergency. After introducing the basic issues related to
safety in shipyards, we discuss the design of an information
system for checking the shipyard safety status, supporting
synthetic information visualization techniques about escape
routes and dynamic evacuation plans. We discuss also the
problems of communicating with workers in case of evacu-
ation using visual cues to signal the correct escape routes.
1. Introduction
Large shipyards for gigantic cruise ships require a special
attention to safety due to the huge number of workers in-
volved, the complex structure of spaces, the large range of
activities performed inside, and the spread in people ability
to react to adverse situations. One of the most critical prob-
lems to be faced in case of an adverse event is the evacua-
tion of workers. Any satisfactory solution to this problem is
based on the possibility to drive the evacuation in an ordered
way. Conversely, the most critical situation is to face a dis-
ordered evacuation, de!ned as a type of evacuation which
adds damages and injuries to people beyond those due to
the disaster.
At the Computer Science Department of Ca’ Foscari
University in Venice, Italy, we have developed a study about
shipyard safety systems with Fincantieri SpA, the largest
Italian shipbuilding company. The study aimed to design:
(a) a comprehensive information system for monitoring the
shipyard in normal and emergency situations; (b) a set of
visual interfaces helping persons in charge of safety to get
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a synthesis of the escape routes situation; (c) algorithms for
computing dynamic evacuation plans; (d) personal devices
and visual cues to drive workers to safe places in case of
emergency. From the perspective of the emergency respon-
sible, the main goal of a safety system is to overcome the
limits of current practices, based on static evacuation plans
and large signboards, whose size and content is de!ned by
a set of of!cial regulations, but that do not adapt well to the
shipyard dynamics. During the building of an environment
wide and complex like a cruise ship plans must be changed
dynamically with the evolution of the environment itself and
the degree of completion.
In this paper we focus on the issues related to the design
and management of information about the ship status during
its building, and to the the visual representation of critical
situations that could lead to emergency problems.
2. Regulations about shipyard safety
The prevention of emergency situation is ruled in Italy by
Law 626 [1], which has introduced professional roles de-
voted to safety control and environmental requirements tar-
geted to risk protection. Among the duties of the emer-
gency responsibles, the most important are risk evaluation,
the adoption of suitable measures to protect the yard and the
people working in it, and the continuous monitoring of the
work places. To achieve their goal, emergency responsibles
and emergency workers must be supported by information
management systems speci!cally targeted to the yard envi-
ronment.
In case of emergency, Law 626 de!nes a number of con-
cepts and procedures targeted to evacuate the workers by
driving them through safe escape paths under any adverse
condition. To this end, qualitative as well as quantitative
parameters are associated to the escape paths and must be
monitored to assure a continuous and up-to-date assistance
to the workers in danger. The parameters describe features
such as the level of risk of the places, the number of differ-
ent escape routes, the width and capacity of the doors, pas-
sages and stairs (called checkpoints, their features are dis-
cussed in Section 5); they also constrain the presence of oc-
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clusions due to work progress and de!ne the size and shape
of the signboards used to signal the escape routes. Such
regulations apply during ship building in order to guarantee
that suitable escape routes exist from any place, sized on the
presence of workers. At the same time, they allow a safety
responsible to check if some limit is trespassed, providing
the means for restoring a safe con!guration.
Law 626 applies to every type of building. As a shipyard
presents speci!c problems due to the pervasive use of metal
as building material, and to the high risk of !re caused by
fuel operated tools, a set of international regulations also
apply, called SOLAS (Safety Of Life At Sea) [2]. SOLAS
regulations de!ne primarily parameters related to !re resis-
tance, which evolve as a deck environment, initially empty,
is progressively populated with halls, cabins, rooms, replac-
ing a large open space with small closed ambients. SOLAS
rules therefore progressively overlap the rules de!ned by
Law 626 as building progresses. This situation, if not prop-
erly driven, may cause con"icts rather then reinforce safety,
also because the risk evaluation made at design time must
be continuously compared with the actual work progress.
3. Safety constraints
Besides architectural issues deriving from the frequent
changes in the spatial con!guration, three classes of con-
straints are relevant to safety.
Technical constraints. Deploying communication and
sensing infrastructures is dif!cult due to the dynamics of
the environment. Large spaces being progressively split
into small closed environments, cables and sensors cannot
be placed freely; moreover, the large amount of metal used
limits radio communication.
Human constraints. Workers in a shipyard are very hetero-
geneous, coming from many countries, with different base
cultures and different skills. As many as 70 different lan-
guages have been counted, English being often unknown;
emergency messages might be misunderstood, or not un-
derstood at all.
Organization constraints. Changes in the environment are
recorded with variable delays, thus leading to inconsistency
between the ship state known by the persons in charge of
safety and the real state, possibly suggesting emergency ac-
tions that refer to an outdated ship con!guration. The most
critical concern is that workers often do not know the real
danger level to which they can be exposed, possibly taking
wrong decisions in case of emergency.
Figure 1 shows four views of a shipyard illustrating typ-
ical cases that can affect safety. The four pictures refer to
normal, allowed situations, not to exceptional or incorrect
situations. The top left picture shows one of the staircases
external to the ship hull, giving access to the decks. The
Figure 1. Views of a shipyard
stairs are not connected to every deck, resulting in more ar-
ticulated routes to escape on ground. The top right picture
shows a deck hosting the passenger cabins before walls’ in-
stallation: the environment is easy to walk, but lacks pre-
cise reference points. The bottom left picture shows the
same deck after cabins’ mounting: places and routes are
clearly identi!able, but the narrow passage can be dif!cult
to traverse in emergency due to partial occlusion caused by
carts and building materials. Finally, the bottom right pic-
ture shows a staircase passage closed by a safety ribbon,
hence not usable.
4. Evacuation management
The main goals of a correct evacuation are to be fast and or-
dered, to give correct information to people in danger, and
to keep control over the environment. They are achieved
by a correct mix of prevention and intervention. Preven-
tion mainly requires the analysis of the potential sources of
emergency problems, through a network of sensors moni-
toring the state of the ship [3]. Intervention requires fast
delivering of correct information, as well as the limitation
of damage propagation with physical and organizational
means.
Therefore, an evacuation management system operates
in two distinct phases: observation time and emergency
time.
Observation time. During the normal work information
about the ship state is collected and processed, generating
knowledge about the workers "ows and the rooms occupa-
tion. This phase prepares the system to plan an evacuation
in case of emergency.
Emergency time. The system delivers reliable information
about how to leave the ship in safety, providing both on-
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Figure 2. The emergency management sys-
tem architecture
board emergency workers and rescue teams with detailed
information on the state of the ship, on the evacuation
progress and on the number of saved people.
Both phases rely on the management and the delivery
of critical information, hence depend on how the informa-
tion is presented, since an emergency situation bene!ts from
pre-attentive stimuli and unbiased signals universally inter-
preted.
5. The emergency management system
A ship is spatially organized in a three level hierarchy [4]:
decks, which mark a vertical decomposition, main vertical
zones (MVZ) corresponding to the longitudinal watertight
compartments, and rooms, like halls and cabins, which are
the areas in a MVZ which can be traversed in case of an
emergency, if free from temporary occlusions. Locations in
a ship are thus identi!ed by three coordinates related to the
deck, the longitudinal frame (counted onward and backward
from the rudder), and the ship side (left, center, right).
Two other elements are of primary importance for mon-
itoring the environment and guiding the workers in case of
emergency: the checkpoints and the well known points. The
simpli!ed concept of communication passage between two
environments used in buildings, e.g., a door, is unsuitable in
a shipyard, due to the large number of types: doors, open-
ings, stairs, steps, etc.. The concept of checkpoint (CKP) is
introduced to de!ne any passage in the environment through
which the number of persons crossing at the same time is
limited and can be measured. Well known points (WKP) are
Figure 3. Information !ow among the system
components
environments with special architectural and functional clues
like theaters, halls, restaurants, lift lobbies, suites, shops,
panoramic walks etc., that can easily identi!ed by everyone
onboard.
A database is built around such a ship structure. It has
a !xed content, describing the ship structure, and a variable
content de!ned by data collected from sensors monitoring
the ship areas during building, which change according to
the actual ship state.
5.1. The system architecture
The emergency management system architecture is shown
in Figure 2. The sensor layer manages the hardware
and software (drivers) infrastructure needed to store in the
database the information on the ship status.
The statistics subsystem is part of the service layer
and manages a data structure containing information about
workers occupation and "ow through the different ship
rooms. Raw data are read from the database and processed
to inizialize the statistics subsystem. The presentation sub-
system uses information from the statistics subsystem and
from sensors to create visual maps about the ship and work-
ers situation.
The evacuation plan creator computes the best escape
ways, storing the information in a data structure that will be
used by the emergency workers subsystem.
In case of emergency, the emergency workers subsystem
uses the data provided by the evacuation plan creator to sig-
nal the best escape ways through the environment devices
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Figure 4. The control center
located in proper places along the escape routes, and possi-
bly through the portable devices worn by the ship workers.
5.2. The information !ow
Figure 3 illustrates the information "ow between the sen-
sor, database and service layers. The numbers in the fol-
lowing description match the numeric labels on the arcs of
the !gure. (1) The sensors monitor the workers’ location
inside the environment. (2) Signals coming from the sen-
sors are processed and converted into usable information;
(3) sensors can be con!gured according to the progression
of the building. (4) Sensors send updated information to
the database. (5) The database is constantly updated to re-
"ect the current ship situation both in normal situation and
in an emergency situation, concerning ship workers, on-
board emergency workers and rescue teams involved. (6)
The statistics subsystem creates and stores the data struc-
tures containing raw information related to people’s "ow,
overcrowding and ship status. (7) The raw statistic data are
combined and interpreted to provide meaningful and reli-
able information to the onboard emergency workers. (8)
Collected statistic data are also used to create an evacuation
plan, dynamically updated as the workers "ow changes. (9)
Visual information is presented on the personal devices of
the onboard emergency workers. (10) If the ship must be
evacuated, visual information about the safe escape routes
is sent to the emergency subsystem that manages the emer-
gency panels and the workers personal displays. (11) Feed-
back is sent to the emergency database in order to identify
critical points such as persisting overcrowding, occlusions
and changes in the escape routes due to the emergency evo-
lution.
5.3. The emergency control center
Figure 4 shows the control center operations. The emer-
gency responsible queries the system about the status of a
Figure 5. The evacuation plan creation
speci!c ship area. A control servlet receives the request and
activates two components that manage the occupation in-
dices of the ship areas (Ship bean component), as described
in Section 6, and the ship planimetry (XML bean compo-
nent) expressed in a XML dialect and stored in the DB.
An Adder component superimposes the two information by
modifying the ship planimetry to add visual information
about the current workers occupation and "ow [5]. The re-
sult is translated to SVG graphics, visualized in a browser
window in the control center.
Emergency plans are maintained starting from initial
plans de!ned according to the of!cial safety regulations.
They are periodically updated as the ship building proceeds
and the occupation of the shipyard areas evolves. Figure 5
shows a fragment of the system devoted to plan update. In-
formation about the current ship status is extracted from the
DB and passed to an emergency plan creator, an algorithm
that builds a network of connections among nodes repre-
senting the locations that can be traversed in emergency.
The arcs are labeled with cost values that are function of
several variables: the most important are the properties of
material as de!ned by the SOLAS regulations, biased by the
knowledge about the current emergency dynamics and the
people "ow. Due to space limitations we do not elaborate
on this algorithm, but it’s worth to note that, since it must be
fast and it must converge to a solution, euristics are adopted
to speed up the computation, even if they do not provide
optimal solutions.
6. Checking occupation and people !ow
Two synthetic features are able to anticipate critical situ-
ations if kept under continuous control: congestion index
and !ow index, respectively measuring the ratio between
people and environment size and capacity (showing over-
crowding), and between people "owing through passages
and passage capacity (showing critical situations due to es-
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Figure 6. The interface for occupation control
caping persons congestion). In most cases the capacity of
environments and passages is !xed by safety regulations,
but the presence of temporary occlusions due to building
material and the reaction of persons to an emergency situ-
ation might reduce the capacity and cause the limits to be
surpassed.
To display the ship environment visual information pro-
cessed by the sensor level is overlapped to the ship map.
Visualization is thus linked to the ship structure, and may
concern a bridge, a MVZ across all the bridges, a MVZ of
a single bridge, or the whole environment of a bridge (least
level of granularity).
Information about occupation is represented using col-
ors; each color represents a different level of occupation, as
de!ned by a legend on the right side of the display. Warm
colors represent high workers concentration, cold colors
represent low workers concentration. In Figure 6 the rooms
of a MVZ are colored and every room displays the number
of persons inside. In such a way both qualitative and quanti-
tative information is displayed, highlighting the real danger
level.
The representation of workers "ow is based on the
checkpoints. Every checkpoint has a theoretical capacity:
the number of persons that can cross it in a unit period of
time without danger. Work tools and materials laying in
the environment can reduce the checkpoint capacity, so we
must know which is the real capacity and how much it is re-
duced with respect to the theoretical capacity. Both must be
displayed to identify situations where the current state of an
environment or of a checkpoint could increase the risk level
and lessen the evacuation speed. A similar concept is the
comparison between the current persons "ow and the sup-
ported "ow as de!ned by the actual capacity, to identify sit-
uations where the dynamics of workers moving could create
bottlenecks.
Figure 7. The interface for people !ow control
These two pairs of measures are represented using
!ames, two overlapped triangles of different color: blue for
the theoretical capacity, red for the real capacity (Figure 7).
In a similar way, green and red "ames visualize the ratio
between the actual "ow and the real capacity. Flames are
drawn on the ship map, aligned with the checkpoints. The
triangle vertex represents the "ow direction. The theoretical
capacity is represented in the background since it is alway
greater or equal to the real capacity, and the overlap between
the triangles immediately shows their relationship.
7. Communicating with workers
Most of the information about the ship actual con!guration
collected during the prevention phase is used to compute
and communicate to workers the escape routes in case of
emergency. Such information, and the way of presenting
it, depends on technical radio communication limits and on
some non technical issues.
Workers usually do not know the whole ship but only the
part in which they work. Suggesting them a path through
unknown ship areas increases the risk; longer escape paths
can be safer if they cross only areas to which workers are
accustomed, where they can !nd known visual cues.
Different ship areas are exposed to different risk levels.
Normative institutions have issued a classi!cation of dan-
ger in different environments. A good escape route crosses
areas with decreasing danger level.
Since people work in groups, the evacuation procedure is
safer if during the escape the cohesion of the group is main-
tained. This principle is very important because the ability
to help each other is increased by people being used to work
together, by speaking the same language, by being used to
understand each other, and by being able to integrate their
partial knowledge of the environment into a more complete
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view of the situation.
To signal the escape routes three issues are important:
(1) to take care of the changes in the environment due to
the building progress, from a skeleton of wide spaces to a
complex structure of small rooms, requiring to adapt the
granularity and the range of the signals; (2) to differentiate
the stimuli used to signal escape routes and wrong paths,
using visual signs for positive stimuli and auditory signs
for negative stimuli; (3) to avoid the use of text in favor of
graphics and symbols independent from speci!c languages
and cultures.
According to these issues, we have proposed two ap-
proaches: a weak approach and a strong approach, differ-
entiated by the spatial granularity of signs and information
delivery. A strong approach requires positioning a larger
number of visual escape signs, and such positioning cannot
be done in a highly dynamic and highly incomplete environ-
ment. A weak approach is based on fuzzy cues which refer
to a few well known locations, easy to identify according
to their function. From a general point of view, during the
building of a ship the system should evolve from a weak to
a strong approach. During a simulation it was evident that
due to the little detail present in initial phases of ship build-
ing, environments are poorly distinguishable unless they are
focal points in the ship (e.g., a hall, which can be easily
recognized even if incomplete), or are connection nodes,
such as stairs and elevators. Such environments are gener-
ally known by all workers, and being a few (with respect
to cabins and corridors) are easily identi!able, therefore are
marked as well known points.
8. Discussion
The evolution of an event like a !re is not impulsive or in-
stantaneous. It starts in a localized area and may extend
potentially to all the ship. But its speed allows people in
charge of safety to adopt local strategies and to follow its
evolution, starting with the evacuation of a limited number
of people close to the !re center, and proceeding to a total
evacuation only if the event cannot be controlled. A plausi-
ble strategy can be based on three elements: (1) An evac-
uation signal (visual and/or acoustic) must be forwarded
only to people inside the area subject to an immediate risk,
through the personal device and the signs in the focal loca-
tions. (2) A feedback signal must be received by the people
in charge of the emergency management, by monitoring the
position of people at risk, checking that they are moving in
the right direction. (3) In case the feedback shows immobi-
lized persons, personal devices should be used as beacons
to guide the rescue squad.
The work presented here has focused mainly on the de-
sign of the information system able to provide timely in-
formation for knowing (and managing) the risks due to an
emergency, and on the visual aspects of emergency informa-
tion management. Future work will explore in details the
dynamics of emergency and the communication between
the control center and the workers. We can anticipate some
themes that deserve attention.
Sensor reliability. Sensors measuring the workers pres-
ence and "ow could be damaged by a !re, creating critical
holes in the monitoring of the evacuation process. Damage
could prevent data to be read, but could also cause the trans-
mission of altered data. Hence, diagnostic functions must
check if the sensors work correctly. Besides using redun-
dancy and transmission channels devoted to check the sen-
sor availability, the shipyard environment is equipped with
many types of sensors, among which the !re and smoke de-
tectors are the most reliable due to their primary importance
in detecting emergencies. They can be used to circumscribe
the areas whose sensing information requires further check
in case of a !re.
Signboards, public displays and personal devices. While
large electronic displays could be useful for delivering pub-
lic information during normal operations, their use is not
advisable in emergency because they violate two important
requirements: (1) since the environment changes continu-
ously, there is a high risk to damage devices devoted to
emergency information, whose position must change with
the building progress; (2) during an evacuation visual stim-
uli (and audio stimuli, which are not described here but have
been considered in our work) are very simple, e.g., based
on colors matching the escape routes, and personalized ac-
cording the path the worker is following. They are better
identi!ed through personal devices and simple color marks,
e.g., with laser-like light that can be seen also in presence
of smoke.
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